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Overview
In the summer of 1991, the California Department of Corrections' (CDC)
institutionalized population reached 10 1,65 8 in cells and dormitories that the
CDC says are meant to hold 54,042. It is a prison system whose numbers
dwarf any other in the country, including the federal Bureau of Prisons.
This flood of inmates has more than quadrupled California's prison population in little more than a decade. A large number of these inmates serve less
than a year. In 1990, there were 25,13 8 inmates in the category of those
committed to California's prisons by the courts who were released within a
year. In addition, another 3 7,197 inmates were in the category of those who
had been recommitted for parole violations and were released before they had
served 12 months. Because these offenders serve such short terms, they
receive virtually no rehabilitative programming, particularly education or
drug treatment.
To house the increased numbers of inmates, CDC instituted the largest prison
building program in the history of the world about 10 years ago. At the same
time, the Department developed a revised, sophisticated classification system
designed to ensure that convicts are housed in facilities which reflect the level
of security needed to incarcerate and control them safely. The classification
system was also designed to determine future construction requirements.
Currently, however, the CDC's classification system has evolved so that many
inmates who could be safely housed in minimum security facilities are
assigned to much more expensive, higher security facilities.
The unmanageable numbers of short-term offenders have made it difficult for
the CDC to provide services for significant segments of its prison inmates.
CDC parole services to reintegrate inmates into the general population have
also been resoundingly ineffective. California returned 39,976 parolees to
custody in 1989, nearly as many parolees as the other 49 states combined for
that year.
This report will show how California's prison operations can become more
cost effective in light of the increased prison population and the phenomenon
of short-term offenders. It will trace the issues of overcrowding and the
conflict within CDC over determining appropriate security placement and
rehabilitative programming for the inmate population.
The first part of the report provides an historical review of CDC penological
philosophy. Beginning nearly 140 years ago, it includes a discussion of the
creation of the classification system for prisoners and how it has impacted
population management, as well as the conflict between punishment and
rehabilitation.
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The second part of the report is a descriptive analysis of the characteristics of
the state inmate population, including what offenses resulted in commitment.
It deals with the increasingly split character of the prison system, a phenomenon in which increasing numbers of short-term offenders are being incarcerated, while at the same time large numbers of other offenders are receiving
longer sentences from the courts.
The third part deals with issues in the management of the prison population,
including the application of a revised classification system which accompanied the new building program. The report will also analyze the degree to
which overclassified inmates have driven up the cost of CDC's construction
program. It will discuss inadequacies in the educational, vocational and drug
treatment programs.
The final section provides policy recommendations to match CDC's inmate
population more closely with security levels and to provide inmates with tools
to keep them from returning to the prison system.

11

An Historical

Review of In 1852, when San Quentin Prison opened its doors to 250 men, "the public
Penological feeling was for the extermination of criminals and, failing that, herding them
into prison for the longest possible term."
Philosophy of
felons
the execution
the California , The
those guilty of
is a
attitude which, more years than
Prison System of
not, has characterized the California prison system. Indeed, until the election
1

1

of Governor
Warren in 1942, the design concept for the state's penal
institutions was to make them grim and forbidding. A California prison
historian wrote that "the predominance of a plain, somber interpretation of
Gothic (architecture) for use as prison facade resulted from early prison
designers' intention to terrify the prisoners rather than from an aesthetic
sensibility." The historian quotes one building committee which ordained that
"the exterior of a solitary prison should exhibit as much as possible great
strength and convey to the mind a cheerless blank indicative of the misery
which awaits the unhappy being who enters its walls." 2

The first decades of prison life
in California were accompanied by astonishing brutality.
Floggings were common.
Overcrowding was the norm.

The first decades of prison life in California were accompanied by astonishing
brutality. 3 Floggings were common. Overcrowding was the norm. In 1854,
lM. Estell, who operated San Quentin on a contract basis with the State of
California, wrote a letter to the California Legislature in which he complained
that "it was not contemplated that there would be more than 50 prisoners at
any one time in the prison for several years. Instead, we have as of this date
over 300,, on hand, not counting 112 who have escaped and never been
recaptured. "4
At the same time, privatization was tried in a particularly unsatisfactory form.
Early in the state's history the California Legislature ordered that prisoners be
leased to private contractors like Estell, who provided food, clothing, housing
and custody in return for labor. That was supplanted, however, by a contract
system under which the state retained responsibility for the care and custody
of prisoners but sold their labor to private contractors. 5 San Quentin Prison
still features a building used for the manufacture of window sashes and blinds
by one contractor. (The sash and blind building was the original site of San
Quentin's death row. It contained the prison's scaffold.) But the contract
system was notoriously corrupt. One early contractor at San Quentin refused
to use prisoners under his employ to build prison buildings for their own
housing, as called for by his contract with the state. Instead, he forced the
inmates to work in the manufacture of farm implements for his own enterprise.6 In 1879, California's Constitution was changed to prohibit contracting
convict labor.?
Punishment for any infraction was solitary confinement on bread and water in
a stone cell devoid of any furnishings except a mattress, which was removed
during daylight hours. Ventilation holes in the iron door were covered by a
1

metal hood, resulting in absolute darkness and isolation. Those who broke
rules were often placed in a kind of prison strait jacket This involved stripping
the inmate
for torture.
Guards
through
minutes, the inmate's hands and
cut off. Sometimes
victims were left for
were permanently crippled by this device. 8

This conflict of philosophies
has continued
the
as the pendulum
state's
has swung between punishment and rehabilitation

There were those who disagreed with such brutality and who believed convicts should be treated more humanely. This conflict
philosophies has
continued throughout the state's history, as the pendulum
swung between
punishment and rehabilitation. Driven by a scandal over the harshness of
prison conditions, a Joint Legislative Committee investigating conditions at
San Quentin as early as 185 7 recommended segregation and classification
prisoners to separate younger, more tractable individuals from hardened
criminals. 9
That was the first such recommendation to classify inmates, but it would
hardly be the last. In fact, questions over classification of prisoners, in varying
degrees, have dogged the system through to the present time. The question of
classification of inmates by level of behavior, amount of time to serve, escape
potential and other factors is important. Classification serves not just to
segfegate inmates by susceptibility to criminal behavior but also to provide a
basis by which inmates can be placed in programs to aid in their rehabilitation.
Today, classification is also a vital tool in determining the kinds of prisons that
the California Department of Corrections (CDC) should construct, since the
level of classification of prisoners determines the level of facilities that are
needed.
In addition to classification and segregation of prisoners, the Joint Legislative
Committee in 185 8 recommended giving prisoners uniforms for warmth,
eliminating inhumane punishment, acquiring books and allowing them to
observe Sabbath days. 10 Some of the recommendations were implemented
for instance, uniforms were issued - and conditions did improve.
A so-called "good time" law was passed in 1864, allowing for reduction in
total sentences for good behavior. 11 (In 1880, the good time law would be
modified to give inmates credit of two months off the total sentence for the
first two years of good behavior, four months off for each of the next two
years, and five months off for each subsequent year until release.) 12
In 1862, a legislative committee on state prison conditions issued a report
recommending a building policy at San Quentin that would take into consideration classification of prisoners. 13 By the 1870s, a group of reformers, called
2

the state
From the
system seemed to function with little
The
only classification that
occurred was
race and

the "New Penologists," also recommended the classification and segregation
of prisoners by age and susceptibility to criminal behavior. As a result of the
legislative committee's report and the reformers' efforts, such a classification
policy became a
prison
it would be discovered decades
later
San Quentin nor
implemented the policy. From the
beginning, the state prison system seemed to function with little oversight.
The only classification that occurred was by race and sex. 14
Original plans to make Folsom a reform-oriented facility rather than a
traditional hard-labor prison were dropped. The prison site was selected in the
1870s partly because it was considered an excellent location for quarrying
rock. Inmates were subjected to rigorous hard labor. They were punished for
various infractions not only with the straitjacket, but also with a device called
the "Oregon boot," whereby a prisoner's foot was encased in metal plates that
could be compressed by turnscrews. A so-called "water cure" was also used.
The naked victim was tied with arms outstretched and blasted with a high
pressure hose. If he opened his mouth to protest, the guard directed water into
his mouth until he lost consciousness. 15
In the 1880s, the reform movement began emphasizing education, vocational
training and self discipline. The California Legislature passed a rudimentary
parole law in 18 89. 16 But despite public support for these reforms, little was
done in the prisons themselves. In 1903, the California State Assembly
authorized a standing Committee on the Prisons to investigate conditions,
which the Committee found to be shocking. The Committee discovered that
most cells held four or five prisoners, that there was no system to segregate
first-time offenders from hardened criminals, and that, in practice, there was
still no classification system to provide a professional assessment of the
degree of an inmate's continuing commitment to crime. The Committee's
report concluded that San Quentin and Folsom were "schools of vice and
universities of crime." 17 The Committee recommended building a separate
unit to house insane prisoners at Folsom, while the rest of the prison housed
the most violent recalcitrant criminals. The Committee further recommended
protecting younger inmates by keeping them at San Quentin, away from the
hard-line inmates at Folsom. 18 These recommendations were ignored, as
previous recommendations had been.
The idea that prison work had redemptive value for inmates began to take
hold at the turn of the century - that those who had lived idle and dissolute
lives should learn the work ethic, and that they also should pay for their own
support by the state while in prison. 19
The reform movement lasted through World War I. During the early twentieth century, an enhanced classification system for probation and parole was
created by the California Legislature to supplement the original1889law, so
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that some offenders could be kept out of the prison system entirely, and others
could be released early. But escapes and public distrust, among other problems, made authorities cautious. In the 17 years after the 1889law, only 223
of 720 men eligible for parole were given an
release. 20
San Quentin and
were swollen with overcrowded inmates,
generally without classification or segregation, until1918, when Folsom was
officially made the state's prison for recidivists. Nonetheless, progress was
made.2 1 In the same year, the California Legislature passed a progressive
indeterminate sentencing law, eliminating mandatory sentences and giving
wardens some discretion in releasing
However,
public outcry against
parole was used sparingly until the 1930s due to
releasing prisoners.
Some felt
sentence would generate fairness in length of stay
because prison authorities could use their judgment to release some offenders
after having served more realistic terms than those imposed by judges, who
meted out vastly different sentences on individuals who had committed the
same crimes. But, while many prison reformers thought the indeterminate
sentence would result in shorter sentences, in some jurisdictions the result was
just the opposite.22
to the rehabilitative
The 1930s represented the beginning of a
philosophies that dominated California penology through the next four
decades. Reformers began to have increasing success in arguing for parole
reforms that the
Penologists had demanded as long ago as the 1870s.
The opening in 1940 of a new low security industrial
California
Institute for Men at Chino, was an example. Reformers had been arguing
since the 1860s for the separation
younger prisoners from older, more
intractable, vicious inmates.
was opened under that philosophy.
In California as almost everywhere else, prison was characterized by overcrowding. But during the two decades following W odd War II, the situation
began to change. Overcrowding and implementation
rehabilitation prowere made easier by a dramatic drop prison populations during the
In 1934, California's two institutions for men
Quentin and
one
an industrial farm at Tehachapi, had a
of more than 9 ,300, or
150 prisoners per 100,000
combined
population. That fell to about 117 per 100,000
1940.
the close of
World War II there were only 5,700 adult
about 63 per 100,000,23
in comparison to the current rate 311
100,000.24
Nonetheless, Richard A. McGee,
was appointed by then-Governor Earl
Warren 1943 to head the prison system, found that prisons were understaffed, ahd that San Quentin and Folsom in particular were governed by a
4

Overcrowding, idleness, poorly
trained and poorly managed
staff, and the neglect of human
needs in areas of health and
spiritual stimulation were the
primary factors that prevented
prisons from working properly.

system of convict bosses who rewarded their allies and punished their enemies. His prescriptions for rehabilitation were relatively simple. Overcrowding, idleness, poorly trained and poorly managed staff, and the neglect of
human needs in areas of health and spiritual stimulation were the primary
factors that prevented prisons from working properly, McGee asserted.25
According to McGee, American prison administrators "have been engaged in
a losing battle to create productive employment opportunities for men and
women serving time in prison." He stressed the need to "provide constructive
occupation for prisoners" as an antidote to prisoner unrest and a public
perception of prisons as institutions where inmates did nothing and came out
unregenerate. Under Governor Warren and with McGee heading the prison
system, a structure "was created through which to interpret and effect penological thinking." 26 Since the system began, according to a prison historian,
"there was a perceived need to separate prisoners from each other and to
classify them according to their predicted ability to return to society as
functioning citizens." By the mid-1940s, the historian wrote, "the California
prison system was set on a new course of integrating criminals into the larger
society." New prisons at Soledad, Chino and Vacaville were all created with
these goals in mind.27
By the mid-1950s, a classification system functioning under the so-called
clinical study method was well in place. When inmates entered reception
centers, they met with a counselor who acted as a diagnostician. The counselor attempted, using experience and intuition, to assess how much of a
behavior problem each new inmate would pose, and how much security
would be needed to house him. The California Institute for Women, built at
Tehachapi in 1936, had a similar reception center to handle women prisoners.
Older male recidivists were sent to Folsom, and more amenable inmates and
first-termers were sent to San Quentin and Chino. Chino was built as a
minimum security prison on the theory that these less criminally-inclined
inmates would be better off associating with their peers and not the toughest
of criminal offenders. 28
But Chino illustrated the problems of the clinical study classification system.
Authorities at San Quentin and Folsom were reluctant to send promising
inmates from their reception centers to Chino. They did not want to lose
inmates to another prison who were conforming, manageable and capable of
doing work outside prison walls. 29
The rehabilitation movement's theories of prison management, emphasizing
the rehabilitative value of work and education, held sway well past the time
when McGee retired in 1967 from the cabinet-level position of Secretary of
the Youth and Adult Corrections Agency, to which he had been appointed by
Governor Edmund G. Brown. By 1972, according to the National Council on
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Crime and Delinquency, prison authorities in nearly every state, the District of
Columbia and the federal government used indeterminate sentencing to
which was considered

6

The previous system had been
heavily weighted toward overclassifying inmates into higher
security levels than their
behavior warranted . . n more
sophisticated classification system was necessary so the
Department could
construction needs to house the

The previous system had been heavily weighted toward overclassifying
inmates into higher security levels than their behavior warranted. That was
because counselors used a subjective system of classification by observations,
which
what statisticians call "false positives." Counselors tended to
far more individuals than
as escape risks or behavior
problems, to prevent the possibility that any would walk away from minimum
or stage violent incidents.
addition, as the federal court emphasized in Palmigiano v. Garrahy, a nore
sophisticated classification system was necessary so the Department could
predicate construction needs to house the projected prison population. The
California Legislature demanded that the Department develop such a system.
In 1979, the Department, aided by a federal grant, began formulation of a new
objective points-based classification system. The system was used to create a
score for each inmate that then would be converted into four general classification designations (Level I through Level IV) corresponding to the levels of
security required. Level I was designated for inmates with the lowest scores,
and thus the least probability for antisocial behavior. Level IV was designated
for those who were the most dangerous. 34
In the meantime, rehabilitation as a penological philosophy in the California
Legislature had lost support. In 1977, the California Legislature rewrote the
Penal Code to exclude all reference to rehabilitation, instead saying it "finds
and declares that the purpose of imprisonment for crime is punishment." 35
The CDC correctional philosophy, however, continued to reflect a need for
rehabilitation in its mission statement, 36 as follows:
1.

Incarcerating California's most serious criminal offenders m a
secure, safe and disciplined institutional setting.

2.

Providing work, academic education, vocational training and specialized treatment for California's inmate population.

3.

Providing parole services including supervision, surveillance and
specialized services with the aim of parolee reintegration into the
community and continuing some of the educational, training and
counseling programs that were initiated during the institutional
stay.

4.

Searching for improved correctional strategies (institutional and
parole) that could enhance the protection of the public through
cooperative efforts with criminal justice system agencies and other
agencies.

5.

Providing public education on the role of correctional
programming.

7

Despite the emphasis in the CDC mission statement on work, academic
education, vocational training and specialized treatment, the penological
philosophy that had governed the California prison system since the mid1940s began to wane. In recent years, California Department of Corrections
as evidenced by the
that it is building classrooms and other
rehabilitative facilities at a far slower pace than it builds beds - reflects the
statutory intent to a greater degree
program mission statement

8

A Descriptive
Analysis of the In 1980 at the beginning of the surge in California's prison population,
California Department of Corrections (CDC) housed 24,569 inmates in
California dormitories and cells that the Department
were designed for 23,5
Department of
the 1980 prison population was at l 04 percent of design bed capacity,
as
defined
by the Department. 37 Today, the prison population stands at
Corrections'
177 percent of design bed capacity.38*
Institutional
Population In an attempt to deal with this influx of prisoners, and faced with the deterioration of existing prisons, CDC in 1980 initiated a massive New Prison Construction and Renovation Program, that ultimately would make the Department the largest in terms of numbers of employees. 39 By mid-1991, the system
included 2 7 prisons, 10 reception centers, 41 work camps and 60 community
corrections facilities, such as return-to-custody units or halfway houses. Nine
more prisons are in varying stages of design, construction or activation. 4 o
These facilities are spread across the length and breadth of California, from
Crescent City (the home of Pelican Bay, the state's most secure prison) to the
Richard J. Donovan facility, which is located 10 minutes from the Mexican
border. The oldest prison in the system, established in 1852, is San Quentin.
San Quentin, Soledad and Old Folsom are tiered prisons with as many as five
floors of cells patrolled by rifle-bearing officers on catwalks. The latest prison
to be opened, which builders hope to replicate not only across California but
throughout the U.S. and other countries as well, is at Wasco. Wasco, like other
new state prisons, is a high-tech facility where officers at electronic consoles
move inmates in and out by touching buttons to control their cell doors.

... the CDC forecasts that. .
institutions will be at 218 percent of design bed capacity ...
CDC projected the institutional population to exceed ...
209,643 by the year 2000.

Including completion of the Department's goal of building 25,000 more
prison beds by 1996, the CDC forecasts that, without changes in the variables
on which they base their forecasts, institutions will be at 218 percent of design
bed capacity, using the Department's definition of "capacity." 41 In April
1991, CDC projected the institutional population to exceed 163,000 in 1996
and 209,643 by the year 2000. 42 ** Even if the building program were to
continue at an accelerated pace throughout the 1990s, there will likely be an
overcrowding problem well above 200 percent ofthe Department's definition

*It is importanrto note that the Departmellf 's polity is to al/emptlo house one inmate in each ceil, despite thefact that
most of the cells hui/tj(Jr higher security inmates contain two built-in bunks. As ofJune 16. 1991, CDC's institUlionalized
populmion reached !01,658 in cells and dormitories meant for 54,042. 43 Thus. despite the biggest prison building
program in the history of !he world. the California prison system is more overcrowded today !lum it was a decade ago.
within the context of the Departmem's definilion
bed capacirr.

**on September I, 1991, CDC said !hal those predictions have been scaled down infight of an unexpecred decline in
new in males this year over the previous year. CDC attrihu!ed the decline to a recent sharp drop in arrests for drug
offenses. CDC Director James H. Gomez warned, however, thai the number of convicts in stale prisons would continue to
increase by more than 5,000 annually even if the previous rate of in male population growth is halved. Top Corrections
adminislrators indicated thatlhey will not revise their population projections until later in J 99 f.
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of design bed capacity by the end of the decade. Thus, even when the CDC
builds prison beds very rapidly, it falls further behind. To operate at what
CDC officials consider an "acceptable" level of overcrowding, which is
120 percent of design bed capacity for dormitory beds and 130 percent
design bed capacity
,300 new prison
be required at an
additional construction cost of $8.2 billion
the end of the century. 44
This single-minded mission

prison construction raises three issues:

1.

CDC's current building program, from its inception, has been at
odds with the characteristics of the inmate population. Since initiation in 1980 of the New Prison Construction and Renovation
gram, the Department has emphasized the construction of high-cost
individual cells. However, the prison population throughout much
of the 1980s increasingly included short-term inmates who could be
safely housed in dormitory-style quarters at 72 percent of the cost
for individual cells.

2.

The focus on housing and the safe holding of inmates has been at the
expense of providing viable work, educational, vocational training
or specialized treatment programs for California's inmate population. CDC's construction program is dictated by an institutional
design capacity that insures the complete control of inmates by a
rapidly growing correctional officer staff. In light of the nature and
types of inmates residing in CDC institutions - a high percentage
of short- term, drug or property offender and parole violators - it is
incumbent on CDC to focus on more than just a building program to
house predominantly long-term inmates.

3.

CDC may be holding to an outmoded cell occupancy policy that
results in inefficient use of space. As overcrowding has increased,
and inmates have increasingly been double-celled, the incidence of
violence, both against officers and inmates, has steadily decreased.
The state's new prisons are so secure that it would be cheaper to
adhere to a standard of double-bunking for Levels III and IV
inmates, except for the least controllable.

Each of these issues will be explored more fully in this report. First, it is
important to understand the characteristics of the current CDC inmate
population.
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CHARACTERISTICS OF CDC INMATE POPULATION

.. as of June 16, 1991, CDC
had jurisdiction over 193,793
adult felons and
a
population equal to a city the
size of Fremont or Huntington
Beach.

or
an imprisoned city
committed for non-violent than violent
commitments are released after a year or
system, 95,705 were in prisons or camps, and 5
were
communitybased facilities. Another 403 were in state hospitals administered by
Department of Mental Health.
Much of the rest of the population under CDC control is comprised of 7 4,65 0
parolees. Some 69,405 are felons, on the street, reporting to parole officers,
while an additional 2,922 are civil narcotic outpatients in drug programs.
The remaining 2,323 are parolees from other states being supervised in
California.
Additionally, 4,330 parolees are supervised by other state, federal or juvenile
jurisdictions, including 2,771 in non-CDC confinement and 1,559 supervised
by other jurisdictions.4 s
Finally, another 13,155 inmates are out to court, escapees or parolees who
have not reported to parole agents.
There are two different time analyses by which the CDC examines the
institutional population. One analysis occurs on December 31st of each year
and examines various characteristics of the total institutional population on
that date. The other type of time analysis examines characteristics of the
twelve-month flow of inmates received and released during a calendar year.
The calendar year analysis is used to predict the trend of future population.
Total Institutional Population

There are twice as many
minority inmates as whites in
the institutionalized population, an incarceration rate well
beyond their representation in
the general population.

Racial and Ethnic Characteristics. There are twice as many minority inmates
as whites in the institutionalized population, an incarceration rate well beyond
their representation in the general population. On December 31, 1990, out of
the total institutional population of97,329, 29.8 percent(28,951) were white,
compared with their representation of 57.2 percent of the state's total population, while blacks were 35.5 percent (34,535) of the prison population, yet
only 7.0 percent of the general population was black. Those of Hispanic origin
made up 30.0 percent (29,212) ofthe prison population and 25.9 percent of
the general population. Asians and other races or peoples of ethnic origin were
4.7 percent (4,631) of the prison population and 9.9 percent of the general
population. 46
12

Type of Commitment and Release. The type of commitment distinguishes
inmates by status and committing authority. On December 31, 1990, the
CDC total institutional population of 97,329 consisted of: 47

... significantly more inmates
(59% v. 41%) were committed

for non-violent offenses ... as
violent offenses.

•

6 l ,357 (63.0%) new admissions from Superior Court. A new admission
have had a prior commitment to CDC, but was not on parole at the
time of committing offense. new admission can be a result of a felony
conviction or a civil narcotic commitment - where criminal proceedings are suspended while the defendant undergoes treatment at the
California Rehabilitation Center as a narcotic addict.

•

21,12 7 (21. 7%) parole violators who returned with new terms from
court. These are parolees who have violated their terms of parole by
committing a new crime and have been returned to prison with new
commitments from court.

•

13,108 (13.5%) parole violators returned to custody. These are parolees
who have violated conditions of parole and have been ordered by the
Board of Prison Terms to return to prison. The maximum term for which
a parole violator may be returned to prison by the Board of Prison Terms
is one year.

•

996 (1.0%) outpatient returns to the California Rehabilitation Center
(CRC). These are narcotic addicts who have violated the conditions of
parole and have been ordered by the Board of Prison Terms to return to
CRC.

•

741 (0.8%) others, including escapees and psychiatric returns.

Committing Offense. As of December 31, 1990, within the total CDC
institutional population, significantly more inmates (59% v. 41 %) were
committed for non-violent offenses (property, drug, DUI offenses) as
violent offenses. As illustrated by Table 1, since 1984, as a percentage
of the total prison population, inmates committed for violent offenses
have significantly declined and inmates committed for property
offenses have declined, while inmates committed for drug offenses have
dramatically increased and inmates committed for other offenses have
increased.
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Table 1

·INMATES BY COMMITTING OFFENSE
for Total Institutional Population
Years Ending 1984 v. 1990
DECEMBER

BER 31,1990

26.271
25 136
5,671

PERCENT
41.0%
27.1
26.0
5.9

96,765

100.0%

56.3%

3LO
, Other Offenses

1,453

9.3
3.4

SUBTOTAL

42,360

100.0%

Missing Data

TOTALS

674

564

43,034

97,329

Source: CDC Offender Information Services.

Time in Prison Since Admission. As Table 2 shows, on December 31, 1990,
10.1 percent of the CDC inmate population (excluding parole violators
returned to custody by the Board of Prison Terms [PV-RTCs]) had been
incarcerated for five years or longer, as compared to 4.7 percent in 1982. As a
result of the increase in the number of inmates currently incarcerated for five
years or longer, despite the increased number of short-term new commitments, the mean time prison for all new commitments currently incarcerated increased, from 1.6 years in 1982 to 1.9 years, where it has remained
s·oce 1988.
Table 2

TIME IN PRISON SINCE ADMISSION FOR MALE FELON PRISON
3
POPULATION
for Total Institutional Population
Years Ending 1982, 1985, 1988, and 1990
DECEMBER 31, 1982

TIME IN PRISON
Less than I yr.

NUMBER

DECEMBER 31, 1985

PERCENT NUMBER

!5,281

49.7%

DECEMBER 3!, 1988

PERCENT NUMBER

20,406

50.0%

DECEMBER 31, 1990

PERCENT NUMBER

30.195

51.6%

41,442

PERCENT
54.5%

I thru I.9 vrs.

7988

26.0

8 987

22.0

II 817

20.2

14139

18.6

2 thru 4.9 yrs.

6,0!5

19.6

8,802

21.6

10.963

18.7

12,758

16.8

5 yrs. or Longer

1.429

4.7

2,616

6.4

5,526

9.5

7.665

10.1

100.0%

40,8H

lOO.Oo/o

76,004

160.0%

TOTAl~'>

MEAN

Source:

30,713

Ui yrs

58,501

l.7yrs

CDC Offender Information Services.
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l.9 yrs.

1.9 yrs.

Calendar Year Institutional Population
Inmates Received and Released. As an illustration of the fluidity of this prison
1990, CDC received
population, during Calendar Year
inmates
number those rP>r•a.nTJ::...n
47,692 (45.2%), were parole
returned to prison
the Board of
Prison Terms. The second largest group was felon new admissions
court,
37.2 percent of those received (39,272 inmates). The third largest group,
14,070 inmates (13.3%), was parole violators with new terms. An additional
2,276 (2.2%) individuals were sent to CDC by the courts under a statutory
provision to determine whether they should be sentenced to prison, probation
or jaiL The final group, 158 inmates (2.1 %), was first-time civil narcotic
admissions.
Virtually all the inmates dL :::barged in 1990 from CDC were released to
parole. Of the 86,600 felon inmates released from CDC institutions, 42,101
(48.6%) were released for the first time to parole, while 39,596 (45.7%) were
parolees returned to custody and subsequently re-released to parole. Others
released were 2,230 (2.6%) county diagnostic cases discharged from CDC
institutions, and 2,551 (3.0%) civil narcotics addicts who were released to
parole outpatient status. Some 122 (0.1 %) inmates who died in CDC institutions were also counted as released. 48
Committing Offense. As Table 3 shows, a review of the committing offenses
of the felon new admissions and the parole violators with new terms admitted
to CDC during the CY 1990 reflects even more starkly that increasingly more
inmates are committed to state prison for non-violent offenses. In addition,
according to the Board of Prison Terms, virtually 80 percent ofPV-RTCs are
returned to custody for non-violent offenses.
Table 3

COMMITTING OFFENSE CATEGORIES FELONY NEW
ADMISSIONS FROM COURTa
for Calendar Year 1990

OFFENSE
Violent Offenses
Prooertv Offenses
DruJZ: Offenses
Other Offenses
Technical Violations
SUBTOTAL
Missing Data
TOTALS

NEW ADMISSIONS
NUMBER
PERCENT
12,529
23.5%
17 335
32.5
18 238
34.2
5,231
9.8
NIA
NIA
53,333

100.0%

PV-RTCs
NUMBER
PERCENT
9,039
19.0%
13 215
27.7
16.5
7 867
9,117
19.1
8,454
17.7
47,692

9

0

53,342

47,692

100.0%

aincludes parole violators with new terms (PV-WNTs) and parole violators returned to
custody (PV-RTCs).
Source: CDC Offender Information Services, and Board of Prison Terms.
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No single societal development has contributed more to the overcrowding of
California prisons than the emergence of the drug culture and growing
penalties enacted to attempt to control it. The drug offender commitment rate
took another big jump last year. During 1990, of the 53,342 new admissions
from court received by CDC, 34.2 percent were convicted of drug offenses, a
staggering leap from the 17.6 percent committed 1985. By contrast, only
23.5 percent of new admissions in 1990 were for violent offenses, compared
1985, when 39.2 percent of the admissions were for violent offenses. 49
Length of Stay. One of the most unique shifts in CDC's prison profile is the
phenomenon of increasingly longer term commitments for some inmates
coupled with a surge in
number of inmates with short-term commitments.
The CDC institutional population is simultaneously being pulled into two
different length-of-stay directions.
Table 4 shows that
CY 1990, 56.6 percent
all new commitment
inmates (new admissions from court plus parole violators with new terms)
first released to parole in 1990, served 12 months or less in prison, and that
35.8 percent spent nine months or less in prison.
though parole violators
with new terms already are on parole, they are considered first releases
because they have been committed by the courts for a new crime.) Parole
violators returned to custody by definition may only be returned to prison for a
maximum of one year. As Table 4 indicates, in 1990, nearly half of all
parolees- 48.8 percent - spent only three months or less in prison. Some
state prison, while
25,138 new commitments spent 12 months or less
15,900 spent nine months or less. In addition, 31,270 parole violators returned
to custody spent six months or less in state prison.

Table 4

1

FELONS FIRST RELEASED TO PAROLE
by Months Served in CDC Onlya
for Calendar Year 1990
NEW COMMITMENTS
LENGTH OF STAY

3 months or less
6 months or less
9 months or less
12 months or less
more/less than 12 mon

NUMBER

PERCENT

1,312
6405
15,900
25 138
44,389

3.0%
14.4
35.8
56.6
100.0%

PV-RTCs
NUMBER

18,555
31 270
34,476
37 197
37,998b

PERCENT

48.8%
82.3
90.7
97.9
100.0%

a Releases to
offenders who have not become eligible
only. Does not reflect
for release.
bparole violators returned to custody (PV-RTCs) may
be recommitted to CDC for a
maximum of one year.
Source: CDC Offender Information Services.
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REASONS FOR RAPID GROWTH OF PRISON POPULATION
There are many reasons given for the recent rapid growth of the short-term
population.
to

While experiencing this significant influx of short-tenn
commitments, CDC is simultaneously experiencing an
increase in the number of individuals sentenced for longer
periods of time.

•

effective
1, 1983, which
that aU residential
burglaries be punished as first degree burglary. In the past, first offenders
would probably have been sentenced to jail or probation.

•

The increase in the average pre-prison confinement time credit received
by CDC inmates. The amount of pre-confinement time served in local
jail is credited against an inmate's sentence when he/she is admitted to
prison. The average pre-prison confinement time credit received by
CDC inmates was 7.9 months in 1988, which was nearly double the
pre-prison confinemer.~ credit of 4 months in 1978.

•

Legislation, which generally is more punitive than in the past, mandates
sentencing many offenders to prison for more types of crimes. Ten years
ago, many of these offenders would have received probation or jail with
probation.

•

Severe overcrowding oflocaljails removing them as a short-term punishment option for felony offenders.

•

Lack of a range of available state or community punishment options
other than overcrowded jails and prisons for short-term felony offenders.

While experiencing this significant influx of short-term commitments, CDC
is simultaneously experiencing an increase in the number of individuals
sentenced for longer periods of time. Legislation has created lengthened and
enhanced sentences for many crimes and the extenuating circumstances
surrounding the commission of such crimes.
Of all inmates currently incarcerated in state prisons, 57 percent were committed for drug, property or other non-violent crimes.* Many of these types of
inmates serve their sentences in county jails, or facilities that cost far less than
prisons. 50 But because few state or local intermediate punishment options
exist, judges are left with few options other than to sentence felony offenders
to probation or prison. Twenty-three counties in the state in mid-1991 were
operating under court orders to keep their jail populations down. The court
orders in these counties affect jails that hold nearly 80 percent of the jail
*These include property offenses plus drug offenses plus "other" nonvwlent offenses. Although arson is included in the
"other" offense category, it must be subtracted from the total because it is considered a vwlent offense.
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population in the state, in every major population area. 5 1 These overcrowded
jails have increasingly forced local authorities to demand that CDC quickly
remove its parole violators and new commitments from local institutions.
They are often on a bus for state prison in as few as eight hours. 52 Judges report
because
they are sentencing greater numbers of offenders to state
there is no room for them in local
short-term
offenders to prison has become the most secure confinement
available
to local judges.53
two months for an inmate to be processed into
system, it is
if not impossible, to
these short-term inmates
through any
program.
primarily California's most serious
offenders has,
been
subverted because ofthe impact of short-term inmates
are unable to take
part in rehabilitative programs.s4
THE PHENOMENON OF UNDOCUMENTED CRIMINAL ALIENS IN
CALIFORNIA PRISONS

Also contributing heavily to
as well as
ma s

is a special cate-

gory of inmate which has

exploded on the scene over the
past decade
the undocumented
whose commitoffense is subject to deportation oro(:eeam

Also contributing heavily to prison overcrowding, as well as to the fiscal
on California's budget, is a special category of inmate which has exploded on
the scene over the past decade - the undocumented alien, whose committing
offense is subject to deportation proceedings. 55 Like their fellow short-term
inmates from local
and the drug
they place a great strain on the
p ·•son system.
officials estimate that
criminal aliens
may comprise as much as 20 percent
prisoners) of
California's
population.* The
of undocumented crimialiens has
as they have served as "mules" or drug couriers into
the U.S. or have been caught up in the California drug scene after they
felonies and drug and
immigrate
They are convicted of
weapons offenses, and face deportation when their sentences have been
served. As of May 1991, the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) had put a "hold" for eventual deportation on more than 9,600 CDC
inmates from 100 countries, about 6,700 of
Mexican nationals. 56
It is further estimated
between 30 and 40 percent of some criminal court
dockets, 30 percent of the
jail population,
20 percent of
probation and parole caseloads are made up the undocumented criminal
alien population category.
than 60 percent of
felony offenses, for
which these undocumented criminal aliens are convicted, are drug or
drug-related. 57
*CDC does not have exact figures for the number of undocumented criminal aliens incarcerated in Califomi£1 prisons.
CDC only tracks aliens who are held for INS deportation procedures. However, CDC officmls estimate that there may be
over 10,000 more undocumented criminal aliens witltin the CDC popuwtion who may be subject to future U.S.
Immigration and Naturalization Service proceedings.
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In recent legislation, the U.S. Congress expressed concern and instructed the
INS to give greater attention to the identification and removal of criminal
aliens from federal, state and local jurisdictions.
federal Immigration and
1
deportation nrr''"'"""""'
their
required law enforcement
officials to notify
when they
on drug charges, any individual
suspected of being an undocumented criminal alien.59
The federal Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 provides for expedited formal
deportation hearings for aliens who are convicted of aggravated feloniesmurder and drug and weapons trafficking. The 1988 Act added the requirement for the U.S. Attorney General to provide for special deportation proceedings to be held at federal, state and local correctional facilities for criminal
aliens. Pursuant to federal ( irectives, proceedings are to be initiated and, if
possible, completed before these aliens finish serving their sentences.6o
CDC and INS entered into an agreement, effective in September of 1987, to
provide for an Institutional Hearing Program whereby federal immigration
judges hold deportation hearings for criminal aliens while still incarcerated in
state prison. 61 Currently, a limited number of deportation hearings are occurring at one CDC institution, the Robert J. Donovan Correctional Facility in
San Diego. Undocumented criminal aliens, who are issued final orders of
deportation, are transferred to INS custody upon the normal completion of
their state sentence.
Significantly reducing the ~tate
and local institutional criminal
alien population would positively impact the entire judicial
system.

Significantly reducing the state and local institutional criminal alien population would positively impact the entire judicial system. Insuring that criminal
aliens are quickly and correctly identified and provided with formal deportation hearings, while institutionalized, would result in the prompt issuance of
orders of deportation, thus, facilitating the entire deportation process.
Removing criminal aliens from state and local custody to federal custody after
issuance of a final deportation order and prior to the termination of state
prison or local jail sentences could save substantial state and local correctional resources. Such action would necessitate cooperation from the federal
Bureau of Prisons, possibly through
legislation, to provide for
federal
of
aliens
deportation until they have
completed their sentences.
Additionally, should
criminal aliens return to this
illegally, a
violation of the deportation order would be a federal offense, carrying a
possible five-year sentence. The federal government would have jurisdiction
for purposes of investigation, prosecution, trial, sentencing and imprisonment
of those who return illegally to this country. As a direct result, the state
criminal court caseloads and state and local correctional populations would
be significantly reduced.62
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Issues in
California
Department of
Corrections'
Population
Management

THE CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM

1

I

Prior to the decision to proceed with the California Department of Corrections' (CDC) massive building program, there were no formal objective
inmate classification guidelines in the California prison system. From the
mid-1950s, incoming inmates were evaluated and classified by committees
and staff specialists who relied primarily on experience and subjective judgment. In 1980, however, partly due to legislative concerns that it would be
difficult to establish a prison building program without knowing the characteristics of the projected inmate population, CDC instituted what would
become, with modifications, the current classification system. It was among
the first such classification systems in the United States.63
All newly committed offenders and parole violators returned to custody are
sent to a CDC reception center, where the initial classification process may
take 30 to 90 days. However, an inmate may be subject to reclassification
throughout the institutional stay. The classification system rates the inmate
primarily for security risk. Facilities are also organized in accordance with a
similar security ranking system. The goal of classification is to place inmates
within the proper security level in prisons. The inmate is classified on a
points-based system involving 38 factors, including criminal history, length of
sentence, behavior during prior terms, escape history, age at time of commitment and other factors. 64

Although CDC claims that the
adminiscrative determinants
are necessary for a complete
classification of inmates, such
subjective determinants can
serve as a convenient method
to override the points-based
classification system, often
resulting in the inmate's
placement into a higher security setting than warranted.

Apart from this points-based classification system, CDC has administrative
determinants, that can override the inmate's score. Many ofthese administrative determinants, including such factors as sex problems, time to serve,
escape risk, known enemies and protective custody needs, are already captured by the points-based classification system itself.
Although CDC claims that the administrative determinants are necessary for a
complete classification of inmates, such subjective determinants can serve as a
convenient method to override the points-based classification system, often
resulting in the inmate's placement into a higher security setting than warranted.65 Thus, the subjective administrative determinant process can act to
override the objective points-based classification system and render it moot
The inmate's score places him within a four-level security system (the lower
the level, the lower the security risk):
Level I inmates:

0-18 points, are non- violent offenders, generally with less
than 30 months to serve;

Level II inmates: 19-27 points, may have prior offenses but "little history of
institutional violence or escapes;"
Level HI inmates: 28-51 points, have received long sentences and have several
prior prison terms or "significant behavior problems;" and
Level IV inmates: 52 points and over, have a "long history of crime or
violence and generally are escape risks."
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inmates are assigned to facilities built with security features that are intended
to correspond with the level of security classification the inmate has been
assigned. 66
This four-level security
is
at
institutions contain facilities which enable them to
security levels. Other institutions may built primarily to
one security
level. The facility rank depends upon its structure, security devices and
assigned staffing. For example:67
Level I:

Inmates are housed in open dormitories without a secure
perimeter.

Level II:

Inmates are housed in open dormitories but the facilities
have fenced perimeters and armed coverage.

Level III:

Facilities have individual cells, fenced perimeters, electronic security and armed coverage. Within some Level III
facilities are special administrative segregation units
which are used as short-term placements for Level III
behavioral problem inmates.

Level IV:

In addition to cells and fenced or walled perimeters, maximum security facilities include electronic security, and
more staff and armed officers than at a Level III facility.
Within some Level IV facilities are Special Housing Units
security for
(SHU) which represent the highest degree
inmates whose institutional behavior or security risk,
irrespective of classification level, cannot otherwise be
controlled.

INSTITUTIONAL BEDS DO NOT MATCH INMATE HOUSING NEEDS

Interestingly, all Levels III and
IV cells, except administrative
segregation units and SHUs,
are designed and built for double occupancy although the
Department's ideal - despite
current forecasts of long-range
overcrowding - is 120 percent of design bed capacity in
Level I and II dormitories, and
130 percent of design bed
capacity in Level III and IV
cells.

CDC defines design bed capacity as: "The maximum number of inmates a
facility was originally designed to house." 68 For Levels I and II inmates living
in dormitories, this means one inmate per bed in areas designated as living
quarters. Overcapacity for Levels I and II inmates would mean that areas not
originally designed to contain beds (e.g., gymnasiums,
warehouses,
classrooms and halls) now house Levels I and II inmates. Design bed capacity
for Levels III and IV inmates is predicated on one inmate per celL Overcapacity means that CDC assigns two inmates to a single cell. Interestingly, all
Levels III and IV cells, except administrative segregation units and SHUs, are
designed and built for double occupancy although the Department's idealdespite current forecasts of long-range overcrowding - is 120 percent of
design bed capacity in Level I and II dormitories, and 130 percent of design
bed capacity in Level III and IV cells. Stated simply, 130 percent of design bed
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capacity means that 30 percent ofthe cells would contain two inmates, and
70 percent would house only one, although most of the cells are built with
two beds. 69

The cost implications of this
"out-ot:Jevel" placemem practice are

If the classification system were a reliable predictor of inmate security needs,
inmates classified as "Level I" would be housed in Level I institutions or beds,
Level II inmates in Level II institutions and so forth for each classification
level. However, in practice there is a significant divergence between this
classification of inmates and their actual placement in a particular institutional security level. The cost implications of this "out-of-level" placement
practice are staggering. If the CDC altered its prison construction program
over the next five years to conform with the projected security classification
levels of inmates, the state could save hundreds of millions of dollars.

The following tables demonstrate the capital and operational cost .... ,J..'-'"
tions of building facilities to match inmate security classification levels and of
adopting double-ceUing as CDC policy.
Table 5 shows the distribution of the male felon population by classification
score and institutional placement in May 1991. For example, of the 20,117
inmates housed in Level I beds, only 14,738 are classified as Level I inmates.
Of the 25,052 inmates classified as Level I, only 14,738, or 59 percent, are
living in Level I facilities. Those actually living in facilities appropriate to their
classification in Levels II, III and IV were 58 percent, 89 percent and 82 percent
respectively. Although out-of-level placements occur for every classification
group, these percentages indicate a bias toward placement of inmates
security settings higher than their classification scores suggest. As demonstrated by Table 5, 3,669 inmates classified as Level I security risks are housed
in facilities built to contain Level HI inmates, and 298 Level I security risks are
housed in Level IV facilities. Similarly, 3,877 Level II inmates are housed in
Level III facilities, and 1 Level II inmates are housed in Level IV facilities.
Table 5

DISTRIBUTION OF MALE FELON POPULATION
by Classification Score and Institutional Placement
May 1991
INMATE CLASSIFICATION
INSTITUTIONAL
PLACEMENT

Inmates

I
I

I

II

HI

IV

Special
Security

Med/
Psych

w/o
Score

TOTALS

Level I
Level II
Level III
Level IV
Reception

14.738

3 143

289

16

0

0

I 931

6347

10050

522

47

0

0

2 250

19 216

3 669
298

3 877

14 797

l 791

70

2 671

3 028

29,903

175

996

8 590

I 983

0

910

12 952

TOTALS

25,052

20117

10971 a
17,245

16,604

10,444

2,053

2,671

8,119

93,159a

a Reception has been reduced to just a total because of the large number of inmates w/o a score; therefore, row
TOTAL does not equal column TOTAL
Source: Report #CLA-2 CDC Offender Information Services, June 18, !99 L
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Table 6 uses the CDC's 1991 inmate classification data from Table 5 and
· extrapolates that data to June 30, 1996. This is currently the furthest point in
time that the Department has made population projections pursuant to its
of
42,650
1991-96 Facilities
Table 6 shows
1
inmates expected to be housed Level I beds,
as
Level I inmates. Ofthe 49,142 inmates classified as Level I, only 31,246 will
be housed in Level I facilities. The remainder of those classified Level I will be
living at higher levels of security. Table 6 row totals (horizontal) are
Department's gross population projections which form the basis for the
CDC's current five-year prison construction program. The Department's
projection of bed needs uses all out-of-level placements, and is not based on
actual classification needs. The Assembly Office of Research (AOR) applied
the percentage of out-of-level classifications derived from Table 5 to the
Department's 1996 population projections.

Table 6

EXTRAPOLATED DISTRIBUTION OF MALE FELON POPULATION
by Classification Score and Institutional Placement

June 30, 1996
INMATE CLASSIFICATION
Inmates

.iNSTITUTIONAL
PLACEMENT

I

III

II

IV

I

Special

Med/

Security

Psych

w/o
Score

34

0

0

4094

0

0

4 528

42650
38673

19,385

95
2 346

92

3,499

3 967

39 175

l 052

9,069

2 093

0

961

13 675

Level I

31,246

Level II
Level ma

12,774

6663
20226

613
1,050

4807

5 079

Level IVa

315

185

18695 b

Reception

TOTALS

TOTALS

49,142

22,100

32,153

11,544

2,185

3,499

13,550

152,868b

aRight hand column population totals are based on CDC Spring 1991 Population Projections, Table 6, last line.
Levels III and IV population numbers were derived from Table 6 as follows:
Level III= IUs+ Med/Psych + PHU (32,520 + 6,495 + 160 = 39,175)
Level IV= !Vs +SHU (11,375 + 2,300

=

13,675)

bReception has been reduced to just a total because of the large number of inmates w/o a score; therefore, row
TOTAL does not equal column TOTAL.
Source: CDC Five- Year Facilities Master Plan, 1991-96.

24

Table 7

I

POPULATION, DESIGN BED CAPACITY, AND OCCUPANCY RATE
by Security Level for Department and Classification-based Projections
June 30, 1996
(1)
DEPARTMENT
PROJECTIONS

Level I
Level II
Level III
Level IV
Receotion
TOTALS
1

42 650
38 673
39 175
13 675
18 695
152,868

(3)

(2)

DBC 3

12 932
16734
20537

OCCUPANCY
RATE(%)

'!i=

11089
70,396

(4)

(5)

CLASSIFICATIONBASED
PROJECTIONSb

DBC 3

329.8%
231.1
!90.8
150.2
168.6

53 236
36 681
29 566
14 690
18 695

217.2%

152,686

(6)
OCCUPANCY
RATE(%)

12 932
16734
20537
9 104
II 089
70,396

411.7%
219.2
144.0
161.4
168.6
217.2%

3
Design Bed Capacity (DBC) numbers derive from Five- Year Facilities Master Plan, 1991-96. DBC for Levels Ill and IV were
calculated to be consistent with population components as follows:
Level III Ills (including Med) + Psych ( 17,634 + 2,903 20,537)
LevellY !Vs +SHU (7,024 + 2,080 ~ 9,104)

bCiassification-based population numbers are adjusted column totals fromm Table 6 and were determined as follows:
Levell Is+ Is wlo score (49,142 + 4,094 53,236)
l.evelll !Is+ lis w/o score (32,153 + 4,528 36,681)
Level lll Ills+ Ills wlo score+ Med/Psych (22,1 00 + 3,967 + 3,499 ~ 29,566)
Level IV~ !Vs + !Vs w!o score+ Special Security (11,544 + 961 + 2,185 14,690)
Reception 18,695 per Spring 1991 projections
Source: CDC Five- Year Facilities Master Plan, 199 I -96, and CDC Spring !991 Population Projections, 1990-96.

Table 7, columns 1-3, compares the CDC's projected occupancy rate (population divided by design bed capacity), with a projection based solely on
inmate classification, columns 4-6. The design bed capacity includes all
existing and currently authorized new prison construction projects and mission changes, and excludes contract community beds. Given the divergence
between needs based on the CDC's projected inmate classification and the
Department's projection of bed placement needs, the prison construction
program has been, and continues to be, skewed toward building higher
security, i.e., predominantly Level III beds, while neglecting Level I bed needs.
The Department's projected Level IV inmate population is nearly comparable
to Level IV bed needs.
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Table 8

TOTAL BED NEEDS BEYOND EXISTING AND AUTHORIZED
DESIGN BED CAPACITY (DBC) FOR 1996 POPULATION
by Security Level for Department and Classification~based Projections
June 30, 1996
(1)
BED NEEDS
BASED ON
DEPARTMENT
PROJECTIONS

I

(2)

I REMAINING
BED"'EEDSa
(col.l-col.2)

DBC

Level I
Level II
Level Ill
Level IV
Reception

35,542
32,228
30,135
10,519
14,381

12,932
16,734
20,537
9,104
11,089

TOTALS

122 805

70 396

(4)

(3)

I

BED NEEDS
BASED ON
CLASSIFICATION
SCORE

22,610
15,494

(6)

II
I

I

II

DBC

REMAININ G
BED NEEDS
(co1.4-col.5)

3.292

44,363
30,568
22,742
1!,300
14,381

20.537
9,104
11,089

31,431
13,834
2.205
2.196
3.292

52 409

123 354

70 396

52 958

9,598

I ,415

I

(5)

(7)

(8)

DIFFERENCE
IN BED NEEDS
(col.6-col.3)

AVERAGE
COST
PER BED{$)

Level I
Level II
Level Ill
Level IV
Reception

+ 8.821

$ 63,095
96,500
110.600
I! 1,666
1!0,600

TOTALS

+

1,660
- 7,393
+
781
0

12,932
16,734

(9)
COST
DIH'ERE"'CE
(col. 7 x col.8)
(million$)
+ $556.56

160.!9
817.67
+
87.21
0.00
.

-$ 334.09

549

a Level l bed need calculation based on Department Projections:
(Level l population divided by Level l Manageable Overcrowding Rate)
Capacity [(42.650 divided by 12) -12,932 22,6101

Existing and Authorized Design Bed

Source: CDC Five-Year Facilities Master Plan, !991-96"

Table 8 calculates additional bed needs in two ways. In columns 1-3 are the
needs based on Department projections contained in the CDC's 1991-96
Facilities Master Plan for facility construction. In columns 4-6 are the bed
needs for 1996 based on inmate classification scores extrapolated from
current ( 1991) figures. Bed needs are calculated by dividing the population
for each security level by the appropriate "manageable overcrowding rate"
(MOR), and then subtracting existing and authorized design bed capacity.
Manageable overcrowding rate is a concept developed by the Department
that recognizes that some degree of overcrowding is manageable, depending
on the type of inmates housed, capacity of the physical plant and program
availability. For inmates housed in cells (Levels III and IV), the Department
plans for a manageable overcrowding rate of 130 percent, while inmates
housed in dormitories (Levels I and II) can be overcrowded at 120 percent.
For maximum security and inpatient psychiatric inmates, no overcrowding is
permitted by the Department.
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Columns 7-9 demonstrate that the prison building program is skewed toward
construction of higher level facilities than the classification system warrants.
A projection of bed needs based on classification rather than the Department's
projections would require 8,821 more Level I beds and 781 more Level IV
beds, but 1,660 fewer Level II beds and
III beds. Overall,
because of the cost differential
construction beds at different security
levels, the classification-based approach would result in a savings of more
than $334 million at projected 1996 costs per bed.

Table 9

TOTAL BED NEEDS BEYOND EXISTING AND AUTHORIZED
DESIGN BED CAPACITY (DBC) BASED ON CLASSIFICIATION
SCORE AND HIGHER OCCUPANCY AT LEVELS HI AND IV
June 30, 1996
(!)

BED NEEI>S
BASEUON
CLASSIFICATJON
SCORE

Level l
Level II
Level lila
Level lVb
Reception

44 363
30 568

TOTALS

(2)

lJBC

(3)

I

(4)

REMAINING
BED NEEDS
(col.!-col.2)

(5)

DIFFERENCE WI
DEPARTMENTAL
BEDl'IEEDS
ASSESSMENT
(col.3-col.3
AVERAGE COST
of Table 8)
PER BElJ($)
8 82 i
I 660
13 603
, 2.082

16.532
X,437
1-U81

12.932
16 734
20.537
9,104
11,089

31 431
13 834
4 005
3.292

0

114,281

70,396

43,885

. 8,524

667

+

$ 63 095

96500
110600
111.666
110,600

(6)

COST
DIFFERENC E
(col.4 x col.5)
(million$)
+ $

556.56
!60.19

I 504.49
232.49
0.00
-$1,340.61

"Level Ill bed need, were determined'" follow>:
Level Ill population "9.566 26Jl67 Ills+ 3,499 :vlediPsych
13.033
Beds for lib at 200'# MOR ~
Reds for Med; Psych at I 00'/r MOR
16.532 Total
IV bed needs were detennined as I(JJlow"
Level IV population 14.690 ~ 12.505 IVs + 2,185 Special Security
Beds for IVs at 200'k MOR
6.252
Beds for Special Security at I00'/r MOR ~ •
85

8,437 Total
Source: CDC five- Year Facilities Master Plan. 1991-96.

Because new cells (as well as
supporting infrastructure such
as offsite utilities) built by the
Department for Levels III and
IV inmates can accommodate
double occupancy, doubleceiling should be adopted as
CDC policy to maximize the
use of available bed capacity
and reduce costs.

Because new cells (as well as supporting infrastructure such as offsite utilities)
built by the Department for Levels III and IV inmates can accommodate
double occupancy, double-celling should be adopted as CDC policy to maximize the use of available bed capacity and reduce costs. Table 9 projects
increasing the manageable overcrowding rate from 130 percent to 200 percent
for all Levels III and IV cells except for medical, psychiatric and special
security units, which comprise 17 percent of these two levels. Immediate
adoption of a classification-based prison construction policy coupled with
double-ceiling rates for Levels III and IV inmates would save more than
$1.3 billion in capital costs by 1996, based on projected costs per bed in 1996.
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Statistics concerning escapes and violent incidents support the idea that
double-celling is practical. Since the inception of California's new prison
building program 1980, both show a steady downward trend. The escape
rate has fallen to its lowest rate since Wodd War II. The rate of violent
incidents has dropped from 11.69 per 100
daily population in 1982 to
6.5 per 100 in 1989. During those years, prison overcrowding went from
104 percent of design bed capacity in 1980 to 177 percent in 1991.

Table 10

COMPARISON OF FACILITIES MASTER PLAN BUILDING
PROGRAM WITH CLASSIFICATION-BASED PROGRAM
June 30, 1996
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

FACILITIES
MASTERPLAN
1991-96

cosr'

CLASSIFICATIONBASED PROGRAM

cosr'

(million$)

(million$)

COST DIFFERENCE
(million$)

Level lb
Level II
Level lii
Level IV
Reception

15 200
15 300
9,800
1,680
3,300

$ 959.04
I 476.45
1,253.38
187.60
299.78

22 550
12 453c
0
0
oc

$1 422.79
I 201.71
0.00
0.00
0.00

+$ 463.75
.
274.74
1,253.38
- 187.60
299.78

-

TOTALS

45,280

$4,176.25

35,003

$2,624.50

• $1,551.75

aBased on projected cost per bed in 1996 per CDC Five-Year Facilities Master Plan, 1991-96, p. 2-31 (Table F), number of beds
from pp. 2-30 and 2-31 (Tables E and Fl
Level III Ills+ Psych beds to be constructed.
'.sin the Master Plan, the assumption is made here that 8,88 t contract community beds will be in use, thereby reducing Level I bed
needs (31 ,431 - 8,881 - 22,550).
cThe 4,672 surplus of Levels III and IV beds completely eliminates building needs forthe reception population of3,292 and l ,380 of
the Level II bed needs.
Source:

... AOR recommendations
on double-ceiling and classification propose 35,003 beds
at a cost slightly more than
$2.62 billion, for a savings of
$1.55 billion in General Fund
Capitol Outlay.

CDC Five-Year Facilities Master Plan, 1991-96.

Table 10 compares the prison building program proposed in the Department's
1991-96 Facilities Master Plan with a modified building program based on
inmate classification and double-ceiling for Levels III and IV inmates, except
medical, psychiatric and special housing units. Additional savings accrue
because of the surplus of Levels III and IV beds (already authorized and
funded) which can accommodate Level II inmates and those in "reception"
status. The Department's Master Plan calls for construction of 45,280 beds
(not including those for women) at a cost of more than $4.17 billion, while
AOR recommendations on double-celling and classification propose 35,003
beds at a cost slightly more than $2.62 billion, for a savings of $1.55 billion in
General Fund Capital Outlay.
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Construction costs are not the only item affected by the skewing of inmate
population demographics toward higher security placements. Annual operatcosts are affected as
that more staff are
to 1

The classification-based
. results in the
need for 409 fewer correctional officers
. . the annual
savings amount
$21.7 million . .

Table 11

fewer correctional
a current average annual cost
$53
including
71 the annual operating cost savings amount to more than
$21.7 million in current dollars.

STAFF NEEDS
Department v. Classification-based Projections
June 30, 1996
(!)

Level
Level
Level
Level

I
II

!II
IV

TOTALSb

(3)

(2)

(4)

(5)

STAFF NEED s
DIFFERENCE

DEPARTMENT
PROJECTIONS

STAFF NEEDS"

CLASSIFICATIONBASED PROJECTIONS

STAFF NEEDS3

(col.4-co1.2)

42 650
38 673
39,!75
13,675

11.847
10 742
13,058
5,470

53 236
36681
29,566
!4,690

14 788
10 189
9.855
5,876

+ 2 941

134,173

4l,tl7

134,173

40,708

409

553
3,203
+ 406

aStaff needs based on inmate to staff ratios, as supplied by CDC Administrative Services Division. Level! is 3.6: I, Level il is 3.6: I,
Level Ill is 3.0:1, and LevellY 2.5:1.
bReception is not included because population counts are the same under both projection methods and, therefore. would not produce
a difference in staff needs.
Source: CDC Five- Year Facilities Master Plan, 1991-96, and CDC Administrative Ser1ices Division.
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PRISON PROGRAMS: A DECADE OF NEGLECT
Prison administrators consider inmate idleness and boredom among the
biggest
to the efficient
The California

Corrections
substance abuse treatment,

work programs have suffered
as a result of the need to house
the

as water
programs as
and vocational""'...,'""'""
at 100 percent of ~-v·.., .. bed capacity. 72

delivery
Prison Industries Authority

McKinsey wrote in a statement prepared for a 1987 Administrative Planning
Session on Department-wide problem areas: 73
There is not adequate available physical plant space in existing
institutions or in the newly designed/opened institutions to
accommodate necessary inmate programming activities when
the inmate overcrowding population approximates 190 percent, nor there adequate physical plant space or support
services space for the staff who are required and hired to
inmates
institution staff needs
support the services to
when
inmate populations approaches 190 percent.
While the Department has attempted to ease this
and some progress
has been made in providing educational facilities, it remains at the very heart
CDC's problems. James H. Gomez, Director of CDC, contends that the
system design is adequate if programs were operated on double shifts, but he
does not have sufficient budget resources to
double-shift programs
the prison system.74
Many criminal justice experts, including Shannon Reffet, Executive Director of the Robert Presley Institute
Corrections Research and Training at
the University
California, Irvine, and James O'Malley, formerly of the
CDC, are convinced that the most effective substance abuse treatment programs are comprehensive educational and job training programs. 75 It is
difficult to provide
educational or vocational programs for those
spending fewer than six months in prison, and virtually impossible for those
spending fewer than three months. Prison officials at Folsom Prison acknowledge that, for many inmates, there is a waiting period as long as two years to
access any .kind of educational or work program. 76
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Work/Training Assignments
is a
Institutions,
able level of program
would be
6 percent of the inmate population eligible for assignment. Thus, an "'"'"'v'.,.
77
number without assignment should be 3,000 to 6,000
As of January 1991, of the 94, 13 3 inmates then in prison, 9,65 2 were on
waiting lists for inmate work/training assignments. Another l 0,683 without
assignments were in Reception Centers, and an additional 4, ll 0 were in
orientation.7 8 However, these 14,793 inmates normally would be unable to
participate in rehabilitation or work programs because they have not yet
received permanent living assignments.
In the best of all possible worlds, the inmates incarcerated for a short period of
time in state prisons should be placed in community-level beds. However,
until a major community corrections building program is initiated, these
short-term inmates must remain in the prison system. Furthermore, it is
unlikely that they will be there long enough to receive program assignments,
either for work or education, two major program areas that have especially
suffered.

Educational and Vocational Programs
In CDC's 1987 evaluation of Departmental problem areas, it was stated that
"existing policies, practices and attitudes regarding educational assignments
have resulted in unacceptable levels of school assignments/attendance leading to underutilization of education resources and low inmate academic and
vocational achievement." 79 Little has changed in the intervening three and a
half years despite
costs which, according to
Department's figures, average $5, 160 per student for primary I secondary academic education
for 12 months of full-time instruction. 80 That compares with an average of
about $4,000 for nine months of instruction in California's public schools. 111
California's approximately
..............,,"""' education programs, and
All ofthe institutions have waiting
Average times on waiting lists vary greatly.
in some prisons inmates must wait as long as two years to
program
educational, vocational or work.8 2

100,000
were enrolled
for one or more
officials
that
access to any

Some 56.4 percent of all inmates read below the ninth grade
which is the
nationally accepted standard for literacy. According to the Department,
level for all males in the prison system is Grade
and
females
83 However, the sample
not tell the
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huge group that cannot read at all," according to James O'Malley, former
Deputy Director ofthe CDC Education and Inmate Programs Unit, who calls
a better education system an "investment aspect." He also says: 84

hours of substance
odds are great
that they will forget that the
are outside
gates.
we can teach them to read, you can
that they won't
forget. With some kinds ofprogramming, it has to be done over
and over and over. But if we can teach them to read, or teach
them math, they won't forget. The best you can hope for, if
inmates are addicted, is to try
educate them out of it.
Correctional officers say much of the current prison educational program
consists of merely going through the motions. 85 S. Shannon Reffet and others
agree. It is not unusual to walk through prison schools, Reffet says, and find
inmates reading newspapers, visiting with each other and indulging in other
activity unconnected with learning.86

Drug Treatment Programs
Drug treatment for inmates in California prisons is inadequate. Nearly
80 percent of inmates have a substance abuse history, and perhaps as
many as 70 percent were under the influence of an illegal drug, other
than marijuana, at the time of arrest.
It is estimated that only about 15 percent of prisoners with substance abuse
problems receive any kind of drug treatment in the federal and state correctional systems nationwide, according to Robert Aukerman, Vice President for
Drug Abuse Issues and Chairperson of the Criminal Justice System for the
National Association of State Alcohol and Drug Abuse Directors. In his
testimony before the U.S. Congressional House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control in May 1990, Aukerman called that figure inadequate.87 On a percentage basis, the nationwide average of 15 percent is five
times more than the number receiving treatment in the California prison
system, where only 3 percent of inmates receive intensive drug treatment. 88
In April 1991, the California Auditor General found that the Department had
not performed nearly half of 38 tasks necessary to get a drug abuse treatment
program established in California prisons. In the Department's report to the
California Legislature, Substance Abuse Treatment and Education Services
for Inmates and Parolees, December 1989, the CDC had scheduled to begin
performing these tasks by January 1, 1991. On that date, however, the Department had not yet created programs to assess inmate and parolee substance
abuse treatment and educational needs, the most basic of these tasks. Without a
needs assessment program, the Department is unable even to determine which
inmates need the substance abuse program it is charged with creating.
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Although Department officials argued to the Auditor General that some of the
tasks were not completed because of lack of funds, 89 some of the most basic
tasks, such as the needs assessment, could have been accomplished without
major funding.
CDC responds that it has "taken steps to identify inmates who are eligible
for substance abuse treatment programs" and has drafted an administrative bulletin that is undergoing final review and should be effective by
September 1991. One program for inmates at the RJ. Donovan Correctional Facility in San Diego has been activated to handle 200 inmates.
Initially, the Department says, the program got off to a slow start because
inmates were reluctant to volunteer for an unknown program that required
involvement, in addition to their current institution work or educational
assignments. Now, however, there is a waiting list of inmates wishing to
enroll in the program.9o
In addition, community-based programs to keep inmates out of the system
have not been effective. The Substance Abuse Revocation Diversion
(SARD) program created by the California Legislature in 1988, and funded
with $5 .5 million, was particularly unsuccessful and since has been discarded
at the request of the CDC Director.9 1 The program, operated through parole
agents, involved what the Department described as intensive supervision of
parolees in an attempt to ensure that they stayed away from drugs. The
Department has pledged to use the funds for other community-based programs. Critics of the SARD program, however, say it was unsuccessful because
Department officials did not implement a truly intensive supervision model. 92
The Department acknowledged to the Auditor General in April 1991 that
it had not begun to evaluate a variety of programs to help inmates
"enhance life skills necessary for success after release on parole." These
programs included creation of a parole services network to help parolees
released in the Bay Area, a 12-step community services program for
recovering addicts that is based on literature developed by Alcoholics
Anonymous, and pre-release education programs involving "release
skills," employability and substance abuse. Steps necessary to increase
community-based services and referrals by parole agents, and include
assessing and monitoring each participant's progress also were not implemented. The Department's explanation for failure to implement several of
these programs was lack offunding. 93 However, as SARD demonstrates, it
is not merely a question of resources, but rather the Department's inability
to implement such programs effectively.
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CONCLUSIONS
The taxpayer would be more effectively served if California could return its
prison system to its historic
Short-term
out of the
prison system and
criminal
aliens should be dealt
their deportation
to their native lands. Those inmates left should be properly classified and
housed in accordance with security risk, and then placed in more effective
educational, work and drug programs to keep them from repeatedly coming
back to prison (recidivism).

It is difficult enough to attempt to rehabilitate incarcerated felony offenders
under any circumstances. Richard McGee pointed out in 1981 that if one adds
to this: 94
... special conditions of enforced confinement, limitations of
personal choices of food, clothing, companions, physical
mobility and occupation, absence of normal sex life, limited
recreational opportunities and a high concentration of social
deviants, all over a period ofmany months or years, one has the
recipe for producing not Jaw-abiding citizens but human
anomalies. That 50 percent or more of them, to the best of our
knowledge, do not come back is more astonishing than that
50 percent of them do.
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Policy
Findings and
Recommendations

More than a decade ago, CDC
iDWUi~U the
m1w·,mu program in the
of the world. At the same time,
a revised,
classification sys""·'"'""" to determine

and
ments ... the classification sys... has resulted in the outot:Jcvel classification
30 percent of the current
and has not

costs to the state taxpayers

are enormous.

California's prison system policy is in crisis because of a massive population
increase over the past decade. A
percentage of these inmates in California
Department
Corrections' (CDC) institutions are
inmates
virtually no
in work, educationor drug treatment More than a decade
al/vocational
building program in
world.
the largest

out-ofcurrent
population, and has
properly. The resulting costs to the
are enormous.
The following policy recommendations would enable the CDC to save
$1.55 billion in capital construction costs, and
million
operating costs by 1996.
The recommendations would also enable CDC to manage its current inmate
its future
population better, to predict more accurately construction needs
population the light of current overpopulation and high number of out-oflevel
and to fulfill its mission statement - to incarcerate
California's most serious criminal offenders in a secure, safe and disciplined
institutional
while providing work, academic education, vocational
training and specialized treatment for the inmate population.

I.

AMEND THE CDC BUILDING PROGRAM TO REFLECT PRISON
INMATE POPULATION MORE ACCURATELY.
A,

Mandate that the California Department of Corrections house
inmates in facilities commensurate with their security classification
level.
CDC classifies inmates into four
security levels via a
points-based system involving 38
These
include
criminal history, length of sentence, behavior during prior terms,
of commitment, among
things.
escape history and age at
sometimes also uses administrative determinants to
inmate's points-based
score and move
of these administrative
to a higher security setting.
including such factors as sex problems,
to serve, escape
needs, are already
risk, known enemies and protective
captured by the points-based classification system itself.
"'"'""'"CDC

determinants are necesinmates, such subjective determinants can serve as a
method to override the objective
points-based classification
often resulting in the inmate's
a higher security setting, at more expensive construction and operating costs.
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Levell inmates, the lowest security level, are housed in open dormitories without a secure perimeter.
Level D inmates are housed in open dormitories with fenced perimeters and armed coverage.
Level Ill inmates are confined in individual cells with fenced
perimeters, electronic security and armed coverage. Within some
Level III facilities are special administrative segregation units
which are used as short-term placements for Level III behavioral
problem inmates.
Level IV inmates, the most recalcitrant or dangerous, are in maximum security cells with fenced or walled perimeters, including
electronic security and more staff and armed officers than in a
Level III facility. Within some Level IV facilities are special housing units, which represent the highest degree of security for inmates
whose behavior or security risk cannot be controlled.
In practice, however, large numbers of low security level inmates
are placed into cells built for higher security level inmates after the
CDC has applied administrative determinants to override the
inmate's points-based classification score. Because the administrative determinant process uses subjective variables to predict security
risks, it seems to render the objective points-based classification
process moot.
At present, nearly 25 percent of inmates occupying Level III cells
are classified as Levels I and II inmates, who could be housed in less
expensive facilities. A more accurate projection of bed needs over
the next five years would require 8,821 more Level I beds, which
will cost an average of $63,095 per bed to construct, and 781 more
Level IV beds, which will cost $111,666 per bed, but 1,660 fewer
Level II beds, which will save $96,500 per bed, and 7,393 fewer
Level III beds, which will save $110,600 per bed. Such a change in
the housing policy to reflect a more accurate approach toward
points-based classification could save the taxpayers $334 million
(at 1996 per bed costs) in the total construction program by 1996.
Annual operating costs are affected as well. Since higher security
level facilities require more intensive staff to inmate ratios, placement appropriate to classification would result in the need for 409
fewer correctional officers by 1996, for a current annual operating
cost savings of more than $21.7 million for salary and benefits.
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B.

Make double-ceiling a CDC policy.

Current policy is to house one inmate in each cell, which the CDC
calls 100 percent of design bed capacity, despite the fact that nearly all
Levels III and IV cells now being built contain two concrete bunks.
Because of the large influx of prisoners, these cells often do accommodate two inmates safely. The state should double-cell inmates as
prison policy. With the Department already placing two inmates
more than 77 percent of all cells, it is de facto policy for all Levels ill
and IV inmates, except the most unmanageable.
The Department's Master Plan calls for construction of 45,280 beds
(not including those for women) at a cost of more than $4.17 billion by
1996, while the Assembly Office of Research's (AOR) recommendations on double-ceiling and classification propose 35,003 beds at a cost
of slightly more than $2.62 billion, for a savings of $1.55 v•n•vu
General Fund Capital Outlay.
C.

Adopt a Community Corrections Act which would provide a wide
range of punishment options at the state and local levels.

Both the California Legislative Analyst in 1991 and the Blue Ribbon
Commission on Inmate Population Management 1990 have called
for the California Legislature to pass a Community Corrections Act.
Such legislation could reduce the cost of the prison system by placing
inmates, who otherwise would be housed in expensive state prisons, into
less costly local facilities. It would expand the use of intermediate
punishment options as an alt~rnative to state prison. The goal of community corrections is to provide more effective treatment and services
primarily to non-violent and substance abuse offenders, thereby reducing recidivism and lowering state costs.
The community corrections option would better serve inmates who
suffer from substance abuse problems, only some of whom are committed for drug offenses. CDC estimates as many as 80 percent of the prison
population has substance abuse problems, irrespective of committing
offense. The Legislative Analyst estimates that in 1991 CDC will spend
$500 million for those inmates committed for drug offenses alone.
Although mandated by the California Legislature to create and implement a comprehensive substance abuse treatment plan for inmates and
parolees by January 1, 1991, CDC, according to the California Auditor
General, has not implemented nearly 50 percent of its "plan."
Legislation should be approved to require CDC to provide comprehensive drug treatment- pursuant to a strategic plan that includes coordination with community-based programs - for inmates and parolees.
Such legislation should have clear sanction language that provides for
CDC budgetary reduction if substance abuse services are not provided.
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Three measures dealing with community
1991-92 Legislative Session.
duced in
sures, as of September 9, 1991 are:

1.
2.
3.
D.

AB 1871 (Burton), Assembly
SB 26 (Lockyer), held in the
tee; and
SB 18 7 (Presley), held
Committee.

were introstatus of these mea-

and

Create a sentencing reform commission to
implementation
of sentencing guidelines which incorporate the expansion of state and
local intermediate punishment options.
Closely related to the community corrections recommendation, sentencing reform would overhaul and conform current sentences to a
larger variety of punishment options. A Sentencing Reform Commission, consisting of representatives from all segments of the criminal
justice system, would make recommendations to the Governor and
the California Legislature to clarify and simplify the current sentencing structure, as well as establish sentencing guidelines incorporating
state and local punishment options. Such sentencing reform would be
aimed at reducing the numbers of convicted offenders serving time in
state prison for minor and non-violent offenses.
Senator Robert Presley is currently developing legislation to create
a sentencing reform commission. Hearings are scheduled for the
Fall 1991 interim.

II. APPEND COST APPROPRIATIONS TO LEGISLATION mAT
ADDS TO mE PRISON POPULATION.
During the previous administration's eight years in office ( 1982-1990),
the Governor signed into law more than 350 pieces oflegislation enhancing or expanding prison terms or creating new penalties. The Legislative
Analyst found that more than 4,000 prison beds will be filled in Fiscal
Year 1991-92 merely as a result of major sentencing legislation chaptered between 1985 and 1989.
The Legislative Analyst also predicts that the cumulative effect of such
legislation will increase the prison population by approximately 10,000
inmates by 1994. Until alternate punishment options are created pursuant to a Community Corrections Act (see recommendation I[C] above),
the California Legislature should not pass legislation which increases
current sentence lengths, enhances current sentences for particular
aspects of a crime and upgrades current criminal penalties unless an
appropriation to pay the added incarceration costs is included within the
legislation itself.
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III. AMEND THE CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE, WHICH NOW
DEFINES PURPOSE OF IMPRISONMENT AS PUNISHMENT
COMMUNITY RE~
ENTRY
\VORK
EDUCATIONAL/VOCA~
TIONAL TRAINING AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE PROGRAMS.
Currently, California Penal Code Section ll
states that "the purpose
of imprisonment for crime is punishment." CDC's mission statement
includes a commitment to provide work, academic education, vocational
training and specialized treatment for inmates. By adopting the proposed
California Legislature would conform the
policy recommendation,
Penal Code to support CDC's mission statement by providing important
legislative intent language. The Blue Ribbon Commission on Inmate
Population Management made a similar recommendation.

IV. DEVELOP FORMAL STATE\VIDE PAROLE REVOCATION
CRITERIA TO BE USED BY ALL PAROLE AGENTS WHEN
DETERMINING WHO SHOULD BE CONTINUED ON PAROLE
AND WHO SHOULD BE REFERRED TO THE BOARD OF PRISON
TERMS FOR REVIEW.
Following implementation of the Determinate Sentencing Law in the
beginning of 1977, the rate of male felon parolees returned to custody
percent in 1983 to an all-time high of 69.1 percent in
leapt from
1989. However, the criteria which guided the parole agents' revocation
recommendations during that period has remained essentially the same.
Thus, an informal policy has guided revocations over the past decade.
Although CDC released a report in I 990 that called for the streamlining
of parole revocation criteria, none of the strategies proposed by the
report have been implemented. Legislation should be approved to mandate the CDC develop and implement specific statewide parole revocation criteria. Sanction language should be included in the bill which
would reduce CDC's parole budget if CDC does not implement such
criteria pursuant to the legislation.

V.

REQUEST THAT THE CALIFORNIA CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION INTRODUCE LEGISLATION TO REQUIRE THE U.S.
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE (INS) AND
THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS EITHER TO PROVIDE
"FOR THE TRANSFER OF SUCH ALIENS TO APPROPRIATE
FEDERAL FACILITIES, ORTO PAY FOR THE COST IN CALIFORNIA OF INCARCERATING UNDOCUMENTED CRIMINAL
ALIENS WHO HAVE DEPORTATION ORDERS.
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As of May 1991, the INS had put a "hold" for eventual deportation on
more than 9,600 undocumented aliens who are CDC inmates. Thousands more have not as yet been put under hold. CDC officials estimate
that as many as 20 percent of the current approximately 100,000 inmate

1.

undocumented criminal aliens,
immediately after
to INS custody for placement in an
INS or federal
of Prisons (BOP) facility (or contract
for the
formal deportation proceedings, completion of
sentence and/or deportation to country of origin. A variation of
option one enhances current procedures. Undocumented criminal
aliens are sent to
INS holds formal deportation hearings
within CDC facilities. When final orders of deportation are issued,
instead
the undocumented criminal alien to remain
CDC custody,
or she would be transferred to INS custody for
placement in an INS or federal BOP facility (or contract facility) for
the completion of sentence and/or deportation to the country of
ongm.

2.

The second option is for the
government to reimburse the
California
the incarceration undocumented criminal
aliens with formal orders deportation.

Either the above-mentioned policy options may
combined with a
cooperative agreement, grounded treaties, between the United States
and the country ongm, to
undocumented criminal alien to
the country's criminal
system to complete the remainder of the
state imposed sentence.
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